Grantham and the media

I haven't written a post on the Queensland 2011 floods for a while.  It is, however, back in the news due to issues relating to events at Grantham.  I have very little to say about that in particular.  Those issues turn on detailed matters of topography and hydrology on which neither I, nor the residents of Grantham have the necessary knowledge to have an informed opinion.  The residents of Grantham do, of course, have the relevant expertise on what they saw; and what they saw must inform any hydrological assessment of the effects of the flood on Grantham.  Knowing what you saw, and interpreting its significance, however, are not the same thing.  Therefore the claims of the Grantham residents do not determine what happened in 2011, and should not by themselves determine the results of the current inquiry.

The task of the inquiry is being made harder by bad reporting on the floods.  I discuss below the fold one such example of bad reporting by Channel Nine, echoed by the Sydney Morning Herald.  Once again I have copied a comment from SkS for convenience, and in this case the first part of the comment is not directly relevant to the issue of bad reporting by media.  I have retained it, however, as it does give useful background on the general situation in the Lockyer Valley at the time of the Grantham flood of Jan 10, 2011.

The Joint Flood Taskforce Report on the Brisbane flood of 2011

The Joint Flood Taskforce has also released a report on the flood.  On factual matters, it largely confirms the SEQWater report where they overlap, but mostly it concentrates on determining an interim standard for flood levels for council planing.  I don't have much more to say about it at this time.

The Insurance Council of Australia Reports on South East Queensland Flooding

Belatedly, I have come across the reports prepared by the Insurance Council of Australia by WorleyParsons, Water Matters International, and Water and Environment.  There are three reports, one dealing with theToowoomba flood, one dealing with the local effects of the Brisbane flood, and one dealing with the background and causes of the floods in the Lockyer Valley and Brisbane River.  The later two are in fact part 2 and part 1 (respectively) of a two part report, and of those two parts, it is the first part (and third linked) that interests me most.  That is because it is that report which contains the information relevant to the issue of the Wivenhoe Dam's operations and strategies that are continuing to interest me.

Mick O'Brien and the Brisbane Flood of 2011

Chemical engineer Mick O'Brien has released his submission to the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry. Mick O'Brien has been the chief informant of the Australian's Hedley Thomas, so unsurprisingly, the submission is just a rehash of many of the inaccurate and unwarranted claims that Hedley Thomas has being making over the last few months.  However, there are a number of points that Mick O'Brien raises that I wish to address, and will do so briefly here.  In later posts, I will give a more detailed survey of information now becoming available as part of the preparation of my own submission to the inquiry.

Reporting on Wivenhoe

SEQ Water have released their initial report on the operations of Wivenhoe and Sommerset Dam during the     Brisbane flood of January, 2011.  I have yet to read it all, but certain things stand out.

The 2011 flood at Wivenhoe, showing inflows (Dark Blue), releases (Light Blue), Dam Levels (Bright Red) and the approximate level of peak flows for the sub catchment in 1974 (Dark Red).  Figure is from the SEQ Water Report, and modified to show 1974 peak.

The key findings are that this was an unusual event, with an Annual Expected return Probability of (possibly) less than 1 in 200, and for some stations, an AEP of less than 1 in 2000 .  That level of rainfall was not predicted in the Bureau Of Meteorology five and three day forecasts, and so was for practical purposes could not have been predicted.  Although the peak inflows to the dam far exceeded 1974 levels (by 200 and 230%), the rise to the peaks was much sharper than in 1974, so that total inflows to the dam only exceeded 1974 levels by 190%.  Peak inflows reached a level with an AEP of approximately 1 in 900.

The value of hindsight, or how to say "I told you so" without ever having done so

On the 9th of March, 2010, the opposition (Liberal National Party) called for a reduction of the flood mitigation capacity of Wivenhoe dam to enhance Brisbane's water supply.  Not content with a review of options, Mr Seeney (LNP Shadow Minister for Natural Resources) demanded that extra water be retained until the completion of any review.  "It would be absurd", he said, "to release water from Wivenhoe until all options are thoroughly investigated."   The LNP renewed its calls after Wivenhoe dissipated a flood event in early October of 2010.   Then Lawrence Springborg renewed the call on December 20th, in the middle of yet another flood event, from which Wivenhoe again protected Brisbane.

These calls represented the ideal time for anyone to argue for enhanced flood mitigation at Wivenhoe.  Those such as Andrew Dragun, who now believes that water should have been released to prevent the risk of flooding, said nothing.  He thought it was far more important to attack the Federal Governments Murray Darling Basin Scheme.  Hedley Thomas, who has run so hard on this story for the Australian, ignored the story.  And Michael O'Brien, the engineer who has so publicly condemned the dam operators was not to be heard. Their wisdom, it appears, is exclusively 20-20 hindsight.

Let's put this in context.

2011 and History: How big was Brisbane's flood of 13/1/2011

In this post I will be returning again to the size of the Brisbane Flood.  The reason for discussing these issues again is that  I have some new and interesting information, and also because these issues continue to be revisited by people who are trying to drum up a witch hunt against either the dam operators or the state government (or both).

After-math 2

It is now long enough after the Brisbane floods for the vultures to start circling.  With 20-20 hindsight they are certain that SEQ Water (the authority managing Wivenhoe Dam) should have done things diferently, and that if they had done so, there would have been no flood worth talking about.

I disagree!

After-math!

The Brisbane flood peak is over, and the peak was below that predicted on Tuesday, though one meter higher than that predicted when I made my last post on the floods.  Unfortunately the flooding in the capital has drawn focus away from victims who have suffered far more from the floods: those west of the range whose towns have been flooded, two, three and in one case five times in less than a month (and who in many cases were also flooded in March); and above all, those in Toowoomba and the Lockyer Valley who faced the devastation of the "inland instant tsunamis".

It has also allowed AGW deniers to start playing there predictable, but disappointing game of "blame the victims".  The floods, we are told, was only so bad because because of inadequate mitigation, poorly managed.  And only a problem at all because fools built houses on flood plains.   Oh, and above all else, the flood did not exceed what commonly occurs due to natural variability.

Under Brisbane Waters?

I have been holding of blogging on the Queensland floods for a week or so, now.  I thought I might wait for a more appropriate time.  This seems like an appropriate time:






Brave New Climate - Qld Floods Highlight the cost of climate extremes (Link added 14/1)